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Introduction
What does Buddhist metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics have to con-
tribute that would be of interest to analytic philosophers? In his engag-
ing and intellectually daring foray into cross-cultural philosophy, The 
Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized, Owen Flanagan tackles this 
question head on. The answer – for philosophers who would care to 
listen – is that Buddhism offers a metaphysics anchored in such robust 
principles as impermanence, no-self, and the ubiquity of causation, an 
epistemology that is thoroughly empiricist, and a eudemonistic ethics 
that prizes compassion. Most importantly, argues Flanagan, is the claim 
“that there are logical connections between these three” (Flanagan 2011, 
206), and the promise of reliable frameworks for exploring them. A phi-
losopher working at the intersection of multiple spaces of meaning would 
find that these logical connections open up new possibilities for enhanc-
ing, refining, and expanding the range of philosophical arguments and 
possibilities, the ultimate and obvious aim of which is to make progress 
in solving enduring philosophical problems.
At first blush it may seem as though Flanagan’s aim in The Bodhisat-
tva’s Brain is a modest one: Unpack for a broader, mostly philosophi-
cal, audience unacquainted with Buddhism what scholars have known 
all along – that Buddhism is host to a complex array of theories and 
practices of unique scope and enduring relevance that could be put in 
the service of addressing many of our most pressing existential and meta-
physical concerns. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals it to be, in Flanagan’s 
own words, “a work of advocacy for something that doesn’t yet have 
any traction, at most a tenuous foothold” (Flanagan 2011, 4), but that 
he thinks ought to exist: namely, Buddhism naturalized. Given that most 
philosophers today take scientific naturalism to provide a robust basis 
for advancing empirical claims to knowledge – and, according to some 
(Kitcher 1992; Stroud 1996), the only such viable basis – if Buddhism can 
be shown to support such claims, then it stands a good chance of making 
a viable contribution to ongoing debates about causation, agency, and 
5  Consciousness, Naturalism, 
and Human Flourishing Consciousness and Human Flourishing Christian Coseru
Christian Coseru
15032-3145d-1Pass-r02.indd   113 8/14/2019   10:36:27 AM
114 Christian Coseru
human flourishing. As someone who has argued at length for the need 
to make Buddhist epistemology receptive to the findings of cognitive sci-
ences (Coseru 2009, 2012, 2018), I am quite sympathetic to Flanagan’s 
approach. But neither Buddhism nor the sciences of the mind speak with 
one voice, notwithstanding popular representations of Buddhism as a 
sort of mind science on the brink of revolutionizing Western con-
ceptions of consciousness and cognition (Wallace 2003). The situation is 
further complicated by the fact that, as Flanagan himself has admitted 
elsewhere (Flanagan 2006), naturalism lacks a common core.
In what follows, I want to pursue the question of precisely what con-
ception of naturalism, if any, is best suited to capture the scope of Bud-
dhist Reductionism, and whether this conception can still accommodate 
the distinctive features of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., subjectivity, 
intentionality, first-person givenness, etc.). In the first section, I review 
dominant conceptions of naturalism, and their applicability to the Bud-
dhist project. In the second section, I provide an example of problematic 
issues more stringent conceptions of naturalism under the guise of neu-
rophysicalism confront, and evaluate Flanagan’s response to these issues. 
In the third section, I consider briefly the reflexivity thesis (the thesis that 
consciousness consists in conscious mental states being implicitly self-
aware), specifically as articulated by Dignaga, Dharmakirti, and their fol-
lowers, and use this thesis to articulate a conception of minimal agency 
as mineness that, I argue, further challenges Flanagan’s neurophysical-
ism stance and his compatibilist account of moral agency. I conclude, in 
the fourth section, by suggesting a way in which no-ownership concep-
tions of reflexive self-consciousness can help us both to get the structure 
of phenomenal consciousness right and to ground our conceptions of 
agency, intentionality, and moral responsibility.
Naturalism and Buddhist Reductionism
A term with multiple and imprecise meanings, ‘naturalism’ denotes a 
specific philosophical attitude and methodological approach that gained 
momentum at the beginning of the last century, when calls for philoso-
phy to discard the supernatural and ally itself with science were first 
heard. As such, naturalism reflects a growing conviction, strengthened 
by advances in the empirical sciences, that reality is exhausted by nature. 
Given the rather imprecise meaning of ‘naturalism’ in contemporary phi-
losophy, coming anywhere close to a unified view would be a daunting 
task. Undeterred by such a challenging task, Flanagan draws a sprawling, 
if eclectic, list of its varying and contested uses: Among them some read 
like rules of etiquette (“1. Philosophy should ‘respect,’ ‘be informed by,’ 
and ‘wholeheartedly accept’ the methods of science”), others like grown-
up advise (“6. There is no room, or need, for the invocation of immaterial 
agents or forces or causes in describing or accounting for things”), and 
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yet others as enticements (“10. Naturalism is a form of non-reductive 
physicalism; there are genuine levels of nature above the elemental level”) 
(Flanagan 2006, 431f).
However capacious and enticing naturalism might be in its many (and 
often conflicting) guises, there are clear objections to its adoption as a meth-
odology for philosophy, and Flanagan is careful to mention two of the most 
obvious: First, Wittgenstein’s (1922) claim that philosophy “aims at the 
logical clarification of thoughts” (Tractatus 4.112) and “is not one of the 
natural sciences” (Tractatus 4.111); and second, Bouwsma’s glib dismissal 
of naturalism for its belief (bordering on faith) in the “universal applicabil-
ity of the scientific method” and its ignorance of the role that mathematics 
plays in experimental science (Bouwsma 1948). To these objections, we 
may add the observation of phenomenologists who, from Edmund Hus-
serl to Dan Zahavi, have argued that what makes philosophy, especially 
after the phenomenological turn, immune to naturalization is that it con-
ceives of itself as a form of transcendental inquiry that seeks to reflect on 
the conditions of possibility for experience and cognition (Zahavi 2013; 
Moran 2013). Of course, this conception of the task of philosophy, which 
goes back to Kant, does not rule out the possibility that empirical studies 
of consciousness might one day vindicate some version of naturalism fine-
tuned to accommodate mental phenomena. Varela’s neurophenomenologi-
cal project (1996) – first sketched in Laughlin, McManus, and d’Aquili 
(1992) – speaks to this vision of cognition as embodied, embedded, and 
enactive, and thus, as seemingly continuous with the environment of which 
it is a part (Lutz 2002; Lutz and Thompson 2003; Thompson 2007).
Considering the centrality of Abhidharma reductionism, with its cardi-
nal principles of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self, it would 
seem that Buddhism is friendly to naturalism, at least in a prescientific 
sense that reflects commitment to empiricism. As I have argued elsewhere 
(Coseru 2012, 3f), epistemological inquires in India never gave birth to 
the sort of anti-naturalism that is associated in the West with the lega-
cies of Descartes and Kant. Nor did Indian epistemology introduce a 
distinction between causal questions (How are veridical states of cogni-
tive awareness produced?) and questions of justification (What criteria 
ensure that we are justified in holding a particular belief?). This lacuna, 
rather than indicating a shortcoming, simply reflects the pragmatic orien-
tation of epistemological inquiry in pre-modern India, where pragmatic 
rather than normative concerns drive most debates about knowledge, its 
mode of acquisition, and its function. With Dharmakirti, an examination 
of the underlying process of cognition becomes instrumental in determin-
ing which epistemic practices are conducing to effective action, giving 
birth to a rich scholastic tradition of both empirical inquiry and debate 
that continues in parts of Asia to the present day.
Can the Abhidharma reductionist accounts of experience, then, be 
extended to accommodate the findings of cognitive science? And would 
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such an extension of its scope offer a viable way of integrating its meth-
ods, ideas, and arguments into contemporary philosophical discourse? 
Describing it as the “First Moral Psychology,” Flanagan finds in its tech-
niques of moral and mental discipline a useful parallel to the Socratic 
directive that an unexamined life is not worth living. But he is quick to 
point out that, unlike Socrates and his followers in the West, Abhidharma 
is a normative rather than a descriptive project: One does not merely 
build a register of mental states as they become manifest in contemplative 
practice; rather, one learns to identify them as wholesome, unwholesome, 
or neutral. For the uninitiated, Abhidharma is likely to come across as 
metaphysics rather than cognitive psychology. In effect, given its focus 
on property particulars and their relations – the much disputed elements 
of existence and/or experience (dharmas) that are constitutive of all com-
posite entities – Abhidharma is best understood as a trope theory.
Consider, for instance, Vasubandhu’s account of the operations of ana-
lytic insight in light of Buddhist reductionism:
One examines the body with regard to its proper and general char-
acteristics, as well as sensation, mind and the other constitutive 
elements of existence. Their own nature is their proper characteris-
tic. But the general characteristic is the impermanence of produced 
things, the fact that everything that is connected with the four afflic-
tions is suffering, and the fact that all things are empty and not the 
self.
(Pradhan 1975, 206)
On the view articulated here, the practice of analytic insight that enables 
us to apprehend the specific characteristics of phenomena, also discloses 
their partite nature, and, given the principle of momentariness, also their 
impermanence. At first, it would seem that what motivates the Abhid-
harma project are metaphysical considerations about personal identity 
and causality (the first, concerned with establishing the no-self view, and 
the latter, with the idea that to exist is to have causal efficacy). But in 
advancing a conception of causation that includes consciousness and 
cognition as efficient causal categories, Abhidharma also presents us with 
a metaphysics of experience: The irreducible elements of existence and/
or experience (dharmas) are not essences or substances, but activities, 
properties, and patterns of connectedness. The project of identifying and 
mapping out these irreducible elements (e.g., sensations, volitions, etc.), 
with a view of achieving specific ends (e.g., virtues such as mindfulness, 
compassion, and equanimity), is both descriptive and experiential. It is, 
thus, a kind of naturalized phenomenology (Roy et al. 1999), that is, as 
a method for bringing into focus, capturing, and categorizing variable 
mental operations and contents that are normally difficult to attended 
to, while also submitting to empirical scrutiny about their causal and 
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conditioning factors (unlike, say, the conception of phenomenology that 
Flanagan appeals to, which stands for a sort of introspective awareness).
That such an attentional skill is itself realized within a continuum of 
causally interconnected states does not mean that its phenomenal proper-
ties are attributable to some sort of persisting entity or to a formal and 
invariant structure of consciousness. Metaphysical explanations typically 
look for a substratum or process, a self or self-grasping tendency that can 
explain why experience has the features that it does. In rejecting such a 
permanent owner and/or locus of experience, however, Buddhism offers 
an opportunity to explore the structure of awareness and the problem of 
personal identity not only on metaphysical and empirical grounds, but 
also in terms of its descriptive and constitutive features: The question 
why self-awareness comes bound up with a sense of self (whether owned 
or merely occurrent) can thus be pursued independently of metaphysical 
concerns about what a self is and what are its fundamental attributes. It 
also allows for an analysis of the structure of attentive awareness without 
assuming that such structure reflects an external relation of ownership 
between consciousness and its self-specifying features (or their analogues 
in the dynamic structures of brain activity).1
I think what Buddhism naturalized ends up looking like largely depends 
on whatever conception of naturalism is in play. A stripped-down, bare 
bones Buddhism without beliefs, set free of its ancillary ‘hocus pocus’ 
notions of rebirth, a karmic system, and ‘bodhisattvas flying on lotus 
leaves’ – the sort that Flanagan favors – most likely will appeal to those 
who reject outright the existence of ‘nonphysical states of mind’ (Flana-
gan 2011, 3). If we are to advance on behalf of the Buddhist any robust 
metaphysical claim – the story goes – nonphysical states of mind cannot 
be any part of it. The metaphysical claim in question is that of physi-
calism – essentially the view that everything that exists is physical or 
supervenes on the physical (Stoljar 2010). The problem with this claim, 
as critics have argued at length, is the very conception of the ‘physical,’ 
which, in the absence of a definition of the essential features that all 
physical things have, but which nonphysical things lack (a task well-nigh 
impossible prior to a complete investigation of all things physical), is too 
vague to serve as a foundation for a complete theory of what there is 
(Chomsky 2006; Dowell 2006). Briefly, defining ‘physical’ simply as that 
which is acknowledged by the science of physics, faces the well-known 
Hempel dilemma: If defined in terms of current physics, well, that is an 
incomplete science; and if defined in terms of a future, perhaps ideal 
physics, well, that is too vague to serve a useful explanatory function 
(Hempel 1969, 1980). Methodological and demonstrative definitions, 
likewise, run into similar difficulties. The first, which defines the ‘physi-
cal’ in terms of what is acknowledged by the basic methodology of phys-
ics, turns a metaphysical question into an epistemological one: It defines 
what there is in terms of how we discover basic facts about the world. 
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The second, which singles out a representative sample of physical stuff 
(‘matter’ of various sorts and the middle-size dry goods that can be fash-
ioned from it) as unequivocally representative of the ‘physical’ assumes 
that we can specify the conditions of similarity and difference for eve-
rything else. Lastly, demonstrative definitions too assume, rather arbi-
trarily, that if something is physical it is exclusively non-mental (Howell 
2009, 87f, 2013, 19f).
The question, then, is this: Are there any alternative ways to advance 
the naturalism strategy that neither embrace physicalism wholesale nor 
reject the explanatory role of efficient causation in settling questions 
about the metaphysics of mind? As I have already noted, later Abhid-
harma, specifically Yogacara conceptions of the mental offer precisely 
such accounts, even as they bracket considerations about the ultimate 
irreducibility of the mental to a more basic substratum that serves merely 
as a repository for phenomenal qualities.
Neurophysicalism and the Selfless Mind
Like people seeking membership into a new and more progressive pol-
ity, ideas too, especially when hailing from our prescientific past, must 
undergo a process of naturalization to gain standing in our modern, sci-
entifically grounded, republic of letters. Naturalism may cut a different 
profile in philosophy than it does in science; ultimately, however, it reflects 
a common ethos: the rejection of supernaturalism and of the whole rep-
ertory of principles, forces, or agencies whose actions are not amena-
ble to efficient-causal explanation. Championed in America by such key 
figures in the pragmatist movement as John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, and 
Roy Sellars, naturalism was first conceived in transactional terms, as 
the transformation of nature in and through experience, a process that 
brings forth emergent properties like color and pain. Dewey, for instance, 
regards color neither as an exclusive property of the object, nor of light 
itself, nor of perception, but as a transactional phenomenon between all 
three (Dewey 1922/1988). In Europe, the situation is somewhat differ-
ent: Influential members of the Vienna circle such as Neurath (1931) 
and Carnap (1932) conceived of naturalism largely as a thesis about the 
equivalence of statements about experience with statements about phys-
ics: “The sky is blue” is ultimately a statement about the psychophysics 
of light perception. Of course, the background philosophical assump-
tions that have kept these early conceptions of naturalism in place have 
now been largely abandoned. Physics and the natural sciences invoked at 
the beginning of the last century to support a conception of the nature 
of nature as material, and thus extra mental, have undergone a radical 
transformation. Quantum mechanics, as a set of mathematical principles 
for predicting the behavior of subatomic particles, may be a very efficient 
way of explaining what happens when phenomena at infinitesimal scales 
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are subjected to the instrumentation of science. But the idea that we can 
give an account of what the world is like at this scale in and of itself inde-
pendently of any observation and measurement thereof is highly contro-
versial (von Neumann 1955; Stapp 1993, 2007; Chalmers 1996).
Neurophysicalism, as the most recent incarnation of these early concep-
tions of naturalism, is predicated on the notion that the scientific method 
should be adopted in examining not only nature but human experience 
as well. A century later, we can state with confidence that the advice of 
these early champions of naturalism has been heeded. The claim that 
reality is exhausted by nature, however, remains problematic in light of 
ongoing debates about the meaning and extension of naturalism. This 
largely ‘semantic’ problem is further complicated by the varying degrees 
of commitment to naturalism: That is, those who operate with a rather 
unrestricted conception of nature embrace a less parsimonious ontology 
than stronger adherents, for whom naturalism serves as a platform for 
excluding most, if not all, of what belongs in the experiential domain. 
Among the latter, one encounters both eliminative physicalists, who seek 
to reduce all mental content to biological and neurobiological processes 
(Broad 1925; Sellars 1956; Quine 1960), and token-identity theorists 
who regard metal states and their neurobiological correlates as identical 
(Churchland 1986, 2013). Both groups are equally diverse, and count 
among their constituents both realist physicalists, who claim that con-
sciousness is part of the physical world, and type-identity theorists, who 
think the subjective and physical domains in effect, coincide.
While the mind sciences do not rule out the possibility that mental 
states have nonphysical properties (indeed, the scope of cognitive science 
is precisely that of understanding the nature of such properties however 
they may be realized, rather than their reduction to more basic elements), 
the overwhelming evidence, argues Flanagan (appealing to an inference 
to the best explanation), is that “there are no such things.” As he further 
notes:
The reason has to do with mental causation. If mental events – for 
example, intentions to act – are, as they seem, causally efficacious, 
then the best explanation is that they are neural events. This is neu-
rophysicalism, the thesis that mental events are brain events or, at 
least, bodily events, and that the subjective character of experience is 
explained by the way nervous systems are connected to the persons 
that house them.
(Flanagan 2011, 65ff)
Now, grounding the efficacy of mental events on that of neural events 
is just what the token-identity view consists in: A particular feeling and 
a given brain state are really the same thing so long as they are consti-
tuted by the same token-event. But the token-identity account fails in one 
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important respect: It does not and cannot explain how the phenomenal 
content of mental states is realized and its apparent capacity to impact 
physical events. Consider a typical example of intentional behavior: a cat 
pushing a water glass over the edge of the table, despite repeated warn-
ings from its owner (such an incident can be easily witnessed curtesy 
of YouTube by simply searching for “cat knocks glass off table”). The 
events certainly admits of two different levels of description: one that 
takes into account goal-oriented behavior and the other that accounts for 
the brain processes underlying this instance of intentional behavior. On 
the token-identity view, the agent’s intention to do x is identical to a par-
ticular subset of neurons firing together. Since the dynamic brain event 
can be described intrinsically, without appeal to extraneous phenomena 
or events, it serves as the sole causal event. We are thus compelled to con-
cede that descriptions in terms of dispositions and intentions are merely 
shorthand descriptions for brain processes. Thus we can understand this 
particular instance of intentional behavior as token-identical with the 
brain process, which alone is responsible for the causal interaction we 
witness at the macro-level: It’s not the cat, socialized into a world of 
domestic wares ripe for playful interaction, that pushes the glass, but 
its brain states. That leaves open the possibility of treating mental states 
as wholly epiphenomenal: They may well capture the seeming nature of 
experience, but they cannot exert any real influence on events occasioned 
by the only causes there are: brain processes.
One may wonder if neurophysicalism does indeed possess the explana-
tory resources necessary for making sense of phenomenal mental states, 
given that, as Flanagan acknowledges, “even the best contemporary sci-
entific work does not yet reveal how even very simple conscious precepts, 
seeing a red patch, seeing a particular bent paper clip, are 
realized” (2011, 87). Not knowing how such basic percepts are realized 
and yet assum-ing that they are so realized takes a leap of faith. At this 
point we may wonder if neurophysicalism is indeed the best strategy of 
naturalization. Aren’t we better served by operating with a more 
capacious conception of nature, one that allows for non-supervenient 
mental causation, and for a theory of action that regards organisms as 
complex adaptive systems (where the mental is a self-organized 
structure with its own emergent dynamics that is not reflected in a 
change in the physical) to play a role?
The naturalism I propose here2 as more suited to the task at hand is 
distinctly phenomenological. It argues that our conception of the men-
tal must account for its phenomenal features in ways that capture their 
event-causal efficacy. These, in turn, become causally relevant in explain-
ing how action is successfully accomplished with respect to criteria 
(e.g., deadlines, assent, opportunity) that are unintelligible in the third- 
personal language of neuroscience. Faced with such accounts of mental 
causation, critics typically invoke the causal closure of physical domain 
as evidence for the epiphenomenal character of mental states. But from 
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the point of view of phenomenological naturalism, epiphenomenalism 
seems odd and unattractive. Indeed, it is rather peculiar to think that 
cognitive events, which arise as a result of the tight causal coupling 
between perception, memory, reflection, and action, should themselves 
be causally inert. Furthermore, arguments that invoke the closure of 
the physical domain have the peculiar distinction of lacking empirical 
grounding: Such closure is often assumed by a priori postulation. Insofar 
as Flanagan favors the view that conscious mental states are identical 
with neural states, he too fails to provide such grounding: “the subjective 
character of experience is explained by the way nervous systems are con-
nected to the persons that house them” (Flanagan 2011, 65f). That there 
is such connection, let alone how it is realized, is simply assumed without 
proof or argument.
The dominant direction of Abhidharma Reductionism does indeed 
point toward a naturalistic explanation of consciousness and agency. But 
limiting all causality to material causality, and treating consciousness as 
identical with brain states, forces Abhidharma Reductionism down too 
narrow a path for its rich accounts of consciousness and causality to have 
any explanatory purchase in charting the efficacy of the Eightfold Noble 
Path project. As such, neurophysicalism also sets the stage for moral epi-
phenomenalism. Yet, the causal closure of the physical domain on which 
neurophysicalism is predicated does not preclude an event-causal expla-
nation of consciousness itself. Indeed, supervenience arguments against 
the autonomy of cognition are meant to refute the existence of a distinct 
metaphysical realm of mental phenomena, not the efficacy of mental pro-
cesses. Lastly, as the late Jonathan Lowe argued at length, causation in 
the mental domain rests on principles of intelligibility (that is, on princi-
ples, which state that it is perfectly intelligible that intentions and motiva-
tions have a causal role in initiating behavior), rather than on principles 
of mechanism (that is, on principles, which explain how causality is actu-
ally realized) (Lowe 2008, 41).
Reasons, Causes, and the Character of Consciousness
The bodhisattva’s brush with MRI scanners is not the first time that Bud-
dhism has faced the challenge of physicalism. First millennium Buddhist 
thinkers such as Dharmakirti and Santaraksita had to wrestle with the 
Indian materialists, the Carvakas. This formidable and uncompromis-
ing group of thinkers, much vilified in a philosophical culture inimical to 
materialism, claimed that consciousness arises from the body in a manner 
similar to the way in which the power of intoxication emerges from fer-
mented grains. Consciousness is a kind of high – a view that all respecta-
ble members of the Beat generation would have enthusiastically endorsed. 
A brief sketch of this seminal philosophical debate should suffice to 
show why the framework of physicalism is problematic when introducing 
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Buddhist Reductionism to Western philosophical audiences. In response 
to the Carvaka’s largely emergentist picture, Dharmakirti and, following 
him, Santaraksita offer a conception of mental and physical elements as 
part of a complex causal chain of dependently arisen phenomena, com-
plex enough, that is, to allow for the multiple realizability of cognition. 
An integral part of the Buddhist critique of physicalism is commitment 
to an ontological difference between ‘cause’ (karaṇa) and ‘condition’ or 
‘conditioning factor’ (pratyaya) in assessing the nature of causality: So 
long as something is deemed a cause it can only give rise to a specific 
type of effect. Conditions, on the other hand, can serve as a basis for the 
arising of multiple effects. A bulbil can only bloom into a specific type of 
water lily, but the same body of water can support any variety of water 
plants.
In claiming that the body alone is the cause of consciousness, the Car-
vaka physicalist assumes an unproblematic understanding of material 
causation. For the Carvaka philosopher Bṛhaspati (ca. sixth century CE), 
for instance, all manner of emergent properties can arise given the right 
combination of elements: While the elements themselves may not possess 
the qualities of the emergent phenomena, they serve as the latter’s material 
support. The physicalist solution to the mind-body problem is thus sim-
ply a matter of either (i) treating mind and body as grounded in the same 
essential nature (svabhava) of the elemental domain or (ii) as a qualitative 
aspect (guṇa) of the body, or as an effect (karya) of the body (Prabhācandra 
1990). If consciousness supervenes on the material elements, it does so 
because, as demanded by the supervenience thesis, the body’s specific con-
figuration and functionality constrains its psychology – a view not unlike 
the ancient Greek harmonia theory, which held the soul to be nothing but 
an attunement of the body’s material elements (Castor 1997).
Can this causal model explain the specific characteristics of all emer-
gent phenomena? In the case of the body, whose material properties are 
empirically discernable, it certainly offers a plausible account. But is it as 
effective in explaining the specific characteristics of consciousness? Here, 
we see called into question the principle, which Saṃkhya philosophers 
too confront, that postulates the non-identity of the effect and the cause, 
(asatkaryavada). As a heterogeneous conception of causality, this princi-
ple ultimately entails the view that anything could come from anything. 
But – argues Santaraksita, taking Dharmakirti’s lead on this issue – cau-
sation follows the principle of homogeneity or “similar kind(s)” (sajati), 
which demands that phenomena arise not in an arbitrary manner, but 
through homogeneous causal chains: like causes like, cows give birth to 
calves, and fermented milk yields yoghurt (Shastri 1968, 449). Atypical 
cases, such as the caterpillar’s metamorphosis into a butterfly, are just the 
exceptions that test the rule.
Following the principle of similar kinds, consciousness could not come 
from something non-conscious, a principle that also serves as the basis 
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for Santaraksita’s definition of consciousness as that which is opposite 
to insentience (Shastri 1968, 478). But if consciousness is neither identi-
cal with, nor simply an emergent property of insentient matter, and yet 
it is only observed when the body is present, what precisely accounts 
for its manifestation? The dependent arising model of causation traces 
the arising of consciousness to the presence of corresponding sensory 
systems and their objects. Depending on a system of vision and a visual 
object, there is visual consciousness. Depending on an auditory system 
and sound there is auditory consciousness. In the case of introspective 
awareness, it is the constitutive elements of the mental domain (thoughts 
and desires) themselves that provide the causal link.
If an intentional mental state can serve as the basis for the arising of a 
subsequent moment of cognitive awareness, then consciousness is a causa 
sui and no longer fits the explanatory model of dependent arising. Here 
the Buddhist confronts a dilemma. Either consciousness is causally effica-
cious within the psychophysical domain or its efficacy is such that it does 
not admit of material explanation. How is it then that the operations of 
mind can be realized within the body, but not be reducible to its bodily 
(read neural) states?
Regardless of the difficulties that causal explanation poses for under-
standing the nature of consciousness, the critique of physicalism advanced 
by Dharmakirti and Santaraksita is instructive in the way it frames the 
principle of similar kinds. Simply put, the principle states that a causal 
relation cannot be established between two things, if changes in one do 
not result in changes in the other. For something to count as the effect 
of a cause it must be brought about by changes in the immediately pre-
ceding instance in the causal chain (Shastri 1968, 449). For phenom-
enal consciousness to be the effect of a body and its sensory organs, its 
presence must be causally dependent on the latter. But, as Santaraksita 
argues, experience suggests otherwise: Loss of hearing, sight, and other 
kinds of sensory and motor impairment do not diminish the self-reflexive 
character of phenomenal consciousness. So phenomenal consciousness is 
dependent neither on the body and the sensory systems working together, 
nor on each of them taken individually. The examples adduced in sup-
port of this view by Santaraksita’s commentator, Kamalasila, illustrate 
their distinctly phenomenological approach: Severed limbs are inert and 
defective sense organs lack cognitive function (Shastri 1968, 452). But 
this phenomenological orientation does not lack empirical grounding, a 
view the Buddhist endorses. A well-nourished body, for instance, alters 
the quality of subjectivity in significant ways, claims the physicalist. True, 
recognizes Kamalasila, but so does the sight of blood for hemophobic 
individuals. Similarly, moods and desires show little correlation with the 
body’s physical strength and stamina. If the body, as the Carvaka claims, 
is the material cause of consciousness, then a strong, vigorous body 
ought to result in a greater degree of clarity, wisdom, and understanding. 
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The opposite, however, is what is observed to be the case: The clarity 
and stability of a conscious feeling, say of love, correlates more strongly 
with a happy and peaceful mind than with a vigorous body. It would be 
a mistake to call youthful infatuation love, just as it would be a mistake 
to call physical stamina wisdom.
The Buddhist does not deny that cognitive awareness is in some kind of 
dependency relation to the body (such relation is demanded by the causal 
principle of dependent arising). For instance, visual awareness can only 
emerge in organisms that are sensitive to light. Like some contemporary 
emergentists, the Carvaka physicalist too grants that cognitive aware-
ness can have novel properties not observed in the material substratum 
(the body) that serves as its basis. But the physicalist also claims that 
consciousness can be present neither when the cognitive systems are not 
yet developed (in the embryonic stage), nor when they are not responsive 
(e.g., in a state of being comatose). Is there a causal criterion for the pres-
ence of consciousness? And, more importantly, can the Buddhist answer 
the challenge of physicalism without appealing to the kind of evidence 
(e.g., the remembrance of past lives) the physicalist cannot accept?
Santaraksita’s response, it seems, signals an important difference 
between the operations of causality in the physical domain and the limits 
models of material causation face when extended to consciousness and 
cognition. Noting the case of dreams, which are obvious cases of cog-
nition occurring in the absence of sensory activity, Santaraksita argues 
for the self-intimating nature of cognitive awareness, specifically its self-
reflexive character, a dimension of consciousness that presumably is not 
affected by the temporary interruption of awareness of oneself and of 
one’s surrounding caused by fainting. The postulation of a non-conceptual 
aspect of consciousness thus allows Santaraksita to frame the question 
of the emergence of consciousness: Whereas the physicalist denies the 
presence of consciousness in the fetus on empirical grounds, the Buddhist 
posits it as simply a case of minimal conscious awareness:
What is the basis for asserting the absence of consciousness in sleep, 
swoon, and other similar states? If it is argued that “Such ascer-
tainment comes from the absence of consciousness,” then, we ask: 
how is such absence (of consciousness) cognized? If it is claimed, 
“no consciousness is cognized in that instance (of sleep of swoon)”, 
then, that is a proof for the existence of consciousness in those states. 
It may be further argued, “If consciousness is present during such 
states, why is there no recollection of such states upon awakening?” 
This reasoning is not an effective refutation of our view. It is lack 
of vividness and other factors that account of the non-recollection 
of (consciousness in such states), as is also the case with conscious 
experience in newly born infants.
(Shastri 1968, 461)
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Sleep, swoon, and other seemingly unconscious states may differ in terms 
of their etiology, but what they all have in common, as states of a living 
organism, is the capacity of awakening. The only case, argues Santa-
raksita where the absence of consciousness is actually observed is that 
of the deceased. But Santaraksita also appeals to an important distinc-
tion between conceptual and non-conceptual mental states. Indeed, the 
philosophical enterprise of Dignaga and Dharmakirti (as informed by 
Yogacara phenomenology) is grounded on the possibility of direct, non-
mediated access to the givenness of experience itself. Cognition, in its 
non-conceptual mode, can be self-intimating without being contentful 
or self-grasping. The autonomy of cognition from its different percep-
tual modalities is also obvious, as the claim goes, in the case of mind 
wandering.
Does appeal to dreams, infatuation, and mind wandering suffice to 
make the case against the physicalist claim that cognition is an emergent 
property of the body? As I have argued elsewhere (Coseru 2017), slight 
variations in the causal chain of interdependently arisen phenomenal cast 
doubt on a strict model of causal generation. If a cause, which otherwise 
may appear perfect in the generation of some effect, fails to do so, specifi-
cally by not occasioning a difference in the mind and that which is men-
tal, then it cannot be counted as such. Santaraksita thus appeals to an 
error argument to target strict causal generation. What Santaraksita and 
his followers argue against, then, is this notion that each mental state is 
instantiated by a suitably relevant combination of physical elements and 
processes. The persistence of perceptual illusion even after disambigua-
tion, and the possibilities of effective action such disambiguation opens 
up (not chasing after a mirage), work against the strict causal model of 
the physicalist.
Conclusion: No Flourishing Without Agency
My aim here has been not to argue for a sui generis Buddhist naturalism 
drawn on the Abhidharma reductionist model. Rather, in taking up the 
question of whether there are better and worse strategies of naturaliza-
tion, first, I put forward a more inclusive conception of naturalism that 
allows for conscious mental states to be part of the chain of dependently 
arisen phenomena, without rendering them epiphenomenal. I call this 
view phenomenological naturalism: The notion that cognitive awareness 
is to be conceived not as an internal state of mind realized by brain pro-
cesses locked into linear causal chains of sensory input, subpersonal pro-
cessing, and behavioral output, but rather as a structure of comportment, 
an intentional orientation and attunement to a world of actions, objects, 
and meaning. On this trope-theoretical phenomenological naturalism, 
we can make sense of how Buddhists can be reductionists about pots 
and selves without being eliminativist about consciousness. Against the 
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claim that any strategy of naturalization whatsoever must necessarily be 
compatible with neurophysicalism – the interpretation of naturalism that 
Flanagan favors – I am arguing for an inclusive conception of nature that 
allows for a minimal conception of agency as self-reflexivity (the aware-
ness by which an events is given as both self-intimating and intentional). 
According to this conception of agency, event-causal explanation (that is, 
causal explanation of an event in terms of its first-person givenness) must 
play a role in understanding the order of the causal domain.
Phenomenological naturalism is in keeping with Buddhist diagnosis of 
the human condition, and the path taken to remedy it. The Buddha, after 
all, emphasizes not only the reality of karmic action but also the efficacy 
of individual effort. To those who claim that nothing is done either by 
oneself or another (e.g., the Ajivika fatalists), the Buddha responds by 
pointing out the inconsistency of such statements: Taking a first step in 
articulating any view whatsoever shows that there is an element of ini-
tiative. The hard naturalist, thus, faces a moral dilemma: What would 
become of the Buddhist account of how human flourishing is achieved 
if this practical philosophy of enlightenment is thoroughly naturalized? 
That is, if morally reactive attitudes such as anger and hatred or, alterna-
tively, shame and apprehension, are impersonal mental factors, how are 
they supposed to serve as a basis for moral agency?
It is widely acknowledged that there is a clear conflict between tradi-
tional conceptions of moral agency and the agent-neutral metaphysical 
picture of causality that we glean from Abhidharma literature. Flanagan, 
much like Siderits (1987, 2008), seeks to resolve this conflict by arguing 
that the two pictures are compatible because the discourse of ‘persons’ 
and the discourse of ‘causes’ belong in two distinct and incommensurable 
domains. But these compatibilist solutions compromise the traditional 
notion of moral responsibility and render ethical conduct indistinguish-
able from merely pragmatic acts. The main thrust of the compatibilist 
move is against the notion of agent causation itself, which social and cog-
nitive psychology has presumably rendered incoherent. It is only to the 
extent that we dispense with such incoherent concepts – as compatibilist 
interpreters of Buddhist action theory argue – that some notion of moral 
agency and responsibility can be salvaged.
Despite the dominant and paradoxical image of the selfless Mahayana 
bodhisattva tirelessly, yet effortlessly, working to put an end to ultimately 
nonexistent human suffering (on account of the nonexistence of sentient 
beings as conventionally established), support for a robust notion of phe-
nomenal agency can be found in nearly all major schools of Buddhist 
thought. Indeed, the Eightfold Path program, much like the promulga-
tion of monastic rules of conduct (the Vinaya), comes in recognition of 
the complex range of personal and subpersonal factors that are constitu-
tive of human agency. Because mental states such as greed, hatred, and 
delusion or, alternatively, loving kindness, compassion, and sympathetic 
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joy, can only be made sense of with reference to the person whose 
states they are, they are irreducibly phenomenal: They only exist first- 
personally. The impersonal description thesis at the heart of Abhidharma 
reductionism may allow for the analysis of mental states in terms of their 
constitutive factors, but for these states to be analyzable at all, and for 
the attribution of moral agency and responsibility to be intelligible, there 
needs to be a conception of first-personal agency in place.3
Does the Buddhist conception of agency demand a radical reassess-
ment of our understanding of voluntary action and of the causal and 
motivational factors that inform, condition, and sanction our valuing 
judgments? In order to answer this question, we must consider the defin-
ing experience that transforms Siddhartha Gautama from a human being 
caught in the causal web into the Buddha, an enlightened being. This 
transformative experience becomes at once the source of the Buddhist 
metaphysical picture of reality and the culmination of all human aspi-
ration for genuine freedom. Firmly situated within this causal web, yet 
unattached to its emerging phenomena, the Buddha can thus declare that 
we ought to regard any form of sensation, attention, and consciousness 
as first-personally experienced, but not first-personally owned: “This is 
not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am” (Bodhi 2000, 887).
This picture of causality, however, does not entail strict determinism. 
The enlightened being’s actions are not so much causally grounded as 
conditioned by an ongoing series of enabling factors. Unlike the typical – 
‘if, then’ – formula of Western forms of sentential logic, the Buddhist 
canonical literature (in both Pali and Sanskrit) uses the locative absolute 
to capture the conditional nature of phenomena: ‘when that, then this.’ 
Hence, the central thesis (grounded in the principle of dependent arising) 
that all Buddhists endorse is: “When this is present, that comes to be; 
from the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not 
come to be. On the cessation of this, that ceases” (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 
2001, 655).
The conception of agency in Buddhism, thus, is not that of an autono-
mous, free-willing agent or self, but of an embodied, self-referential, and 
self-specifying bundle of aggregates. We can thus get on with the busi-
ness of charting out the experiential domain using the ‘when that, then 
this’ formula with enough confidence that when we act, as opposed to 
merely being acted upon by causal factors beyond our control, we do 
so for reasons that reflect both self-concern and concern about the con-
sequences of our actions. We may dispute the libertarian conception of 
an unconditioned spontaneity. But reflection compels us to acknowledge 
its epistemic and phenomenological salience in differentiating between 
voluntary and involuntary actions, and the moral import of those actions 
that we voluntarily undertake. Of course, choice means that the alterna-
tives so entertained are equally attainable, and that deliberation is effec-
tive in charting the range of available possibilities.
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Notes
1. I develop this point at length in Coseru (2019).
2. Developed at length in Coseru (2012).
3. For an extensive treatment of the agent-neutral consequentialist framework of
Buddhist ethical theory, see Coseru (2016).
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Mahendrakumar. New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
Pradhan, P. 1975. Commentary on the Compendium of Superior Knowledge 
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